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SUBPRIME BAILOUTS AND THE PREDATOR
STATE
Steven A. Ramirez

INTRODUCTION
According to Senator Dick Durbin, the Senate Majority Whip, the
banking industry is the “most powerful lobby” in Congress and “they
frankly own the place.”1 Congressman Collin C. Peterson, the chair of the
House Agriculture Committee, maintains that derivatives regulation is
problematic in Congress because “[t]he banks run the place.”2 President
Obama pledged that his administration would include no lobbyists, and then
promptly waived his own new rules so that a former Goldman Sachs
lobbyist could be the Chief of Staff for the Secretary of the Treasury.3 In the
election of 2008 the banking and investment banking industry contributed to
both the Democratic and Republican candidates: according to
Opensecrets.org, Senator John McCain’s top five campaign contributors
were all large financial institutions.4 President Barack Obama received even
more contributions, from essentially the same financial firms, totaling more
than $3.5 million.5 Financial interests as a whole spent $450 million to
lobby policymakers in 2008.6 So it should come as little surprise that when
the Obama Administration drafted proposals for the reform of financial
regulation, in June of 2009, it included bank executives and lobbyists in its
deliberations.7 It also raises fundamental questions about the trillions in
government commitments lawmakers made in late 2008 and early 2009 to
save our financial sector from mass bankruptcy.8
The influence of the banks presents a challenge to the legal system.
1
Frank Rich, Obama’s Make or Break Summer, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at WK8 (quoting
Senator Dick Durbin).
2
Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., Even in Crisis, Banks Dig in for Battle Against
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A1.
3
Fredreka Schouten, Exceptions to Ethics Rules Under Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 2009, at 4A.
4
Opensecrets.org, Top Contributors to John McCain, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/
contrib.php?cycle=2008&cid=n00006424 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
5
Opensecrets.org, Top Contributors to Barack Obama, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08
contrib.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00009638 (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
6
Opensecrets.org, Washington Lobbying Grew to $3.2 Billion Last Year, Despite Economy,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/01/washington-lobbying-grew-to-32.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2009).
7
Stephen Labaton, Obama Sought a Range of Views on Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009,
at A1.
8
Economists have recognized that corruption, career aspirations, or personal prestige may lead
policymakers to bailout financial institutions in times of strife. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN,
TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 53 (2009).
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The legal system as advertised holds that no man (or corporation) is above
the law.9 Our government is “a government of laws, and not of men.”10
Among other things, this means that legal rules are announced in advance,
with clarity, not changed ex post; market actors face the same rules
regardless of their wealth or political influence, and no economic actor has
the power to change the rule in light of an unpleasant economic outcome.11
Simply stated, if a business enterprise faces insolvency then it must face the
legal consequences of insolvency, which should not be averted through a
government rescue.12 Otherwise, economic incentives are distorted as
creditors begin to respond to government guarantees (implicit or explicit)
with an expanded supply of credit, and management becomes less risk
averse in view of the government’s guarantees of failure.13 Competitors, in
turn, will seek to become too-big-to-fail (“TBTF”) so that they too may
enjoy government guarantees and a lower cost of capital.14 Some
competitors will be unable to compete with large subsidized rivals and will
fail.15 This massive distortion of incentives undermines the primary virtue
of free markets: the creation of incentives and disincentives for maximum
human productivity.16 Nevertheless, in 2008-2009, the U.S. government
expended massive funds and made massive guarantees to the financial
sector, which ultimately benefited reckless bank managers and creditors
who had not bargained for a government guarantee of the funds they
extended to risky financial firms.17 This practice brazenly violated any
9

Scholars have long recognized that interest groups with concentrated members and concentrated
wealth have superior incentives to organize and therefore benefit disproportionately from the legislative
process. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 2, 11, 165 (1971) (stating that very large groups will not pursue organizations to influence
public goods like law because rational actors will instead assume that they can free ride on the efforts of
others).
10
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
11
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 65-66 (2004)
(noting that stripped of all its technicalities the rule of law means that government acts only in
accordance with “‘rules fixed and announced before-hand [which allows one] to plan one’s individual
affairs on the basis of this knowledge’”) (quoting Friedrich Hayek).
12
Until recently, it was thought that banks facing insolvency are put into receivership under the
supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). Robert R. Bliss & George C.
Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 143, 145 (2007). Other firms facing insolvency are subject to the federal bankruptcy code. Id.
at 160.
13
STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 2, 17-18, 23-24.
14
See id. at 20-42. Recently, the debt of Goldman Sachs has traded at more narrow credit spreads
relative to Treasury debt. A Tale of Two Bailouts, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A13.
15
See Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 1943 (2008), available at http://www.atypon-link.com/doi/abs/10.1257/aer.98.5.1943
(finding that “zombie” firms, that is firms that would be insolvent without assistance, are associated with
reduced investment in non-“zombie” competitors).
16
Indeed, laissez faire enthusiasts have long argued that the maintenance of appropriate incentives
was the primary reason society must tolerate high inequality and otherwise unacceptable levels of
poverty. Steven A. Ramirez, Bearing the Costs of Racial Inequality: Brown and the Myth of the
Equality/Efficiency Trade-Off, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 90 (2004).
17
Banks that are deemed TBTF have an advantage in the capital markets and many bank mergers
are apparently pursued to attain TBTF status rather than the operating efficiencies. STERN & FELDMAN,
supra note 8, at 32-33.
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reasonable concept of the rule of law.18 There was no announced law that
the government would save the creditors and managers of particular banks
that would be deemed TBTF, only an “inchoate public policy notion that
certain institutions are so large or so complex that the government will
intervene and prevent their failure by protecting uninsured creditors . . . .”19
Today, this lawlessness creates even more risk, as the TBTF banks are even
bigger and thus present even more systemic risk.20
The bailouts of the financial sector of 2008-2009 also do not enjoy
support from macroeconomic science. The government faced a variety of
means and alternatives to dealing with the financial crisis.21 Maintaining
“zombie banks”22 at the apex of our financial sector lacked evidence of a
reasonable prospect of macroeconomic success because such banks cannot
supply the credit needed for growth.23 Banks faced with the prospect of
insolvency will become risk averse and clamp down on lending.24 If they
enjoy sufficient market power they will seek to squeeze additional profits
from their customers.25 They may seek to postpone their insolvency through
various machinations with respect to their balance sheet.26 They may hoard
capital to guard against further losses.27 They may reduce their workforce to
cut costs.28 All of this is adverse to macroeconomic performance, over the
18
As Professor Tamanaha suggests the “thinnest” version of the concept of the rule of law would
only require that “‘whatever a government does, it should do through laws.’” TAMANAHA, supra note
11, at 92 (quoting Noel B. Reynolds). “Understood in this way, the rule of law has no real meaning, for
it collapses into the notion of rule by the government.” Id. Every government world-wide would satisfy
this promiscuous standard for defining the rule of law, and over the course of history such notoriously
outlaw states as the southern Confederacy or Nazi Germany would conform to the rule of law. See id. In
short, the rule of law would be worthless for securing human well-being.
19
Yomarie Silva, Comment, The “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine and the Credit Crisis, 28 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 115 (2009).
20
David Cho, Banks 'Too Big To Fail' Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. POST (Maryland), Aug.
28, 2009, at A01.
21
William F. Stutts & Wesley C. Watts, Of Herring and Sausage: Nordic Responses to Banking
Crisis as Examples for the United States, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 577, 626-27 (2009) (outlining major
differences between the U.S. efforts to resolve financial crisis in 2008-2009 compared to relatively
costless government resolution in Sweden and Norway).
22
Zombie banks are banks that are insolvent but remain in a near life condition due to government
subsidies. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? 4 (Martha Burt et
al. eds., 1989).
23
Paul Krugman, Banking on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at A27.
24
Kelly Evans, Bank Clampdown Dogs Economy: Lending Standards Keep Tightening, Increasing
the Risk of a Prolonged Recession, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2008, at A3.
25
See Julia Kollewe, George Soros Warns ‘Zombie' Banks Could Suck Lifeblood out of Economy,
April 7, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/apr/07/george-soros-zombie-banks.
26
Susan Pulliam & Tim McGinty, Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2009, at A1.
27
Martin Feldstein, America’s Mortgage Meltdown, Aug. 27, 2009, http://business.smh.com.au/
business/americas-mortgage-meltdown-20090826-ezub.html (“When home owners default, banks lose
money, and uncertainty about the extent of future defaults undermines confidence in banks' capital,
making it harder for them to raise funds and causing them to reduce lending to conserve their
resources.”).
28
“During the last three months of 2008, the largest banks that received taxpayer loans announced
more than 100,000 layoffs.” Bailout Banks Sought More Foreign Workers, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 2,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/02/business/main4768439.shtml.
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short term. Over the longer term, once the zombie banks become
accustomed to their privileged status as wards of the state they are apt to
gamble for resurrection and undertake very risky lending in vain hope that
more risk could pull their firms out of the government’s care.29 The
government subsidies at the heart of the TBTF approach create industrywide distortions in incentives and excessive risks.30 Thus, economies
burdened with zombie banks frequently suffer adverse economic
consequences for years to come.
This article will show that the bailouts of 2008 and 2009 were
contrary to the rule of law as well as sound economics, and that the law
must respond to this gross injustice by imposing a regime in accordance
with notions of the rule of law and rationalizing any future government
assistance to failing firms which present systemic risk.31 Part I will review
the details of the bailouts of 2008-2009, highlighting the many ways in
which they violated the rule of law, appropriately conceived. Part II will
demonstrate that while the economy required government intervention to
avoid a cataclysm, it did not require the subprime bailouts that occurred.
Part III will articulate a rationalized legal framework that should govern
bailouts, based upon the use of civil and criminal sanctions to impose
disincentives upon managers of firms flirting with TBTF status. These
proposed sanctions impose costs directly upon the CEOs of firms that have
permitted their business to become so large and complex that it imposes
fiscal and macroeconomic costs upon society in general. The goal is a
match between penalties and costs. The chasm between an optimized
approach to government bailouts and the legal reality of the bailouts forms
the foundation for the conclusion of this article: the rule of law must govern
government assistance going forward to prevent further bailouts driven
purely by political power and economic caprice.
I. THE SUBPRIME BAILOUTS OF 2008-2009
In what can only be described as an orgy of reckless financial
management, a number of very large financial firms pursued short-term
profits without regard to risks borne by their firms in one of the greatest
29
During the late summer of 2009, banks recommenced risky lending. Kristen Haunss & Jody
Shenn, Leverage Rising on Wall Street at Fastest Pace Since ‘07 Freeze, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 28,
2009, http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a_XpcU5pY0f4.
30
Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., warned in 2002 that large financial firms would exploit the
“generous subsidies” available to firms deemed TBTF and that both regulatory pressure and market
discipline were unlikely to curb “formidable risks” that federal funds would be needed to bailout such
firms. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 476 (2002).
31
According to the most sophisticated business observers, “taxpayers can only guess at the specific
reasons behind the ad hoc rescues that began with Bear Stearns in March of 2008” and regulators refuse
to disclose the underlying facts that may have driven their decisions. Who's Too Big to Fail?, WALL ST.
J.
ONLINE,
Sept.
13,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204731804574386932897872954.html.
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credit bubbles in history, starting in 2004 and continuing through 2007.32
Much of this excessively risky credit found its way into the U.S. residential
real estate market via subprime loans.33 Managers seemingly lost all
concern for the well-being of their firms and their shareholders in the pursuit
of obscenely large compensation payments or golden parachute payments.34
Various managers exploited the real estate and credit bubbles in various
ways, but essentially, managers ignored clear risks in the vain hope that easy
money would keep the party going indefinitely.35 By the spring of 2007,
however, the music stopped playing, and with the party winding down the
inevitable hangover meant one thing for ordinary Americans: economic
crash.36 Moreover, the reckless lending in America soon infected the entire
global financial system and ultimately caused a global synchronized
recession costing trillions in foregone output.37
The first expenditure of federal funds in support of a failed financial
institution involved the collapse of Bear Stearns (a large investment bank) in
the spring of 2008. The Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) initially agreed
to lend billions to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase on March 14,
2008.38 Shortly thereafter, Bear Stearns merged with JPMorgan Chase for
$10 a share or less than 10 percent of Bear Stearns' market value just months
before.39 The Fed facilitated the merger through $30 billion in special
financing.40 The Fed took control of a portfolio of Bear Stearns assets
amounting to $30 billion.41 JPMorgan Chase would bear the first $1 billion
of any losses associated with the Bear Stearns assets, and the Fed would
32
See Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6-9, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1364146).
33
Home Mortgages: Recent Performance of Nonprime Loans Highlights the Potential for
Additional Foreclosures: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (statement of
William B. Shear, Director Financial Markets and Community
Investments), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09922t.pdf (“Nonprime mortgage originations grew rapidly from 2000
through 2005 before sharply contracting in mid-2007 . . . .”).
34
Ramirez, supra note 32, at 66-67.
35
Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince infamously stated: “‘When the music stops, in terms of liquidity,
things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re
still dancing.’” Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of
the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1 (quoting Citigroup Chief Executive, Chuck Prince).
Ultimately, Prince resigned and collected $38 million in severance pay. James Politi, Wall Street on
Defensive over Pay Packages, FIN. TIMES,, Mar. 8, 2008, at 20.
36
See Feldstein, supra note 27.
37
IMF: Global Recession Worst Since Depression, CHINA DAILY, April 23, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-04/23/content_7707566.htm (reporting that forgone GDP
worldwide would amount to $4 trillion in 2009 alone, in addition to $4 trillion in credit losses).
38
Gretchen Morgenson, Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at
BU1.
39
Yalman Onaran, Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, Bernanke Says,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=
worldwide&sid=a7coicThgaEE.
40
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement on Financing Arrangement of JPMorgan
Chase's Acquisition of Bear Stearns (Mar. 24, 2008) (available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080324.html).
41
Id.
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absorb any losses from the remaining $29 billion on a non-recourse basis to
JPMorgan Chase.42 JPMorgan Chase received $30 billion in cash but was
only obligated to repay $1 billion.43 The Fed received $30 billion in Bear
Stearns assets that it manages today through an entity called Maiden Lane
I.44 The Fed acted under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,45 a
provision the Fed had not used since the Great Depression.46 Thus far, it
appears that the Fed has lost about $3.4 billion on the Bear Stearns bailout.47
The hope that the Bear Stearns bailout would stabilize the financial
system was short-lived. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers
(“Lehman”), a large investment bank, declared bankruptcy, in the absence of
federal assistance.48 The failure of Lehman appeared to quickly deliver a
lethal blow to financial stability.49 The fall of Lehman was followed by
instability in global money markets, and commercial credit subsequently
froze.50 Some commentators argue that Lehman’s failure did not cause the
financial market instability.51 Nevertheless, the consensus view is that the
failure of Lehman led directly to unprecedented financial chaos.52 In any
event, “the market was . . . bewildered when the Fed rescued certain firms
and not others,” and the decision to rescue Bear Stearns and then permit
Lehman to fail is often cited as the most prominent example of the ad hoc
nature of the government’s bailouts.53 Other commentators suggest that
such uncertainty has long been inherent in the current ambiguous and
42
Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns Announce Amended
Agreement (Mar. 24, 2008 (available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM_redesign/
JPM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template&cid=1159339104093&c=JPM_Content_C).
43
Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Hand Behind the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at C1.
44
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Maiden Lane Transactions, http://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/maidenlane.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
45
12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). “This 1932 emergency authority for discounts ‘in unusual and exigent
circumstances’ for individuals, partnerships and corporations was used sparingly, and just 123 loans were
made over four years [during the Depression] by all 12 banks, totaling about $1.5 million; the largest
single loan was for $300,000.” David Fettig, Lender of More Than Last Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002,
at 15, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf.
46
David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph: Section 13(3) Enacted Fed Business Loans
76 Years Ago, THE REGION, June 2008, at 33, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/
08-06/section13.pdf.
47
Alister Bull, Fed Loss on Bear Stearns, AIG Loans Shrinks a Bit, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE57K4AX20090821.
48
Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
52098fa2-82e3-11dd-907e-000077b07658.html.
49
Emily Kaiser, Lehman Fallout Threatens Deeper, Wider Recession, REUTERS.COM, Sept. 16,
2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idINIndia-35488720080915.
50
Bob Ivry et al., Missing Lehman Lesson of Shakeout Means Too Big Banks May Fail,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=
aX8D5utKFuGA.
51
Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?4 (Univ. of Pa. Law School, Inst..
for Law & Econ., Working Paper 09-11, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfj?
abstract_id=1362639 (“the ‘Lehman effect’ on the markets stemmed more from the news that a major
investment bank was financial distressed than from the news that the bank had filed for bankruptcy. It is
not obvious that a rescue loan to Lehman would have prevented the general disruption and crisis of
confidence . . . .”).
52
Evan Thomas & Michael Hirsch, Paulson’s Complaint, NEWSWEEK, May 25, 2009, at 52.
53
Anna Jacobson Schwartz, Op-Ed., Man Without a Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at WK12.
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discretionary regime.54 One fact is clear: Lehman’s failure did immediately
precede more financial problems, particularly a run on money market funds,
after one such fund, which was holding Lehman debt “‘broke the buck.’”55
Within a few days of the fall of Lehman, the world’s largest
insurance company, AIG, teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.56 AIG
apparently guaranteed the obligations of a number of obligors of other
powerful financial firms through an unregulated instrument known as credit
default swaps.57 If AIG had failed, it could have inflicted up to $180 billion
in losses on its credit-default swap counterparties.58 Among those exposed
to the failure of AIG was the large investment bank, Goldman Sachs
(“Goldman”). Goldman, whose alumni included then Secretary of the
Treasury Hank Paulson and his predecessor in the Clinton Administration,
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, apparently would lose $13 billion if
AIG failed.59 Goldman was not alone, and if AIG failed there was a
substantial prospect that a number of other large financial firms would
follow.60 Consequently, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Secretary of Treasury
Hank Paulson engineered a bailout (amounting to a maximum $182.5
billion) to keep AIG out of liquidation at a cost to the taxpayer, as of fall of
2009, of $86.8 billion.61 The statutory basis of the bailout was again section
13(3).62
Bernanke and Paulson were not finished. On September 18, 2008,
they gathered Congressional leaders to inform them that unless they funded
a massive federal bailout immediately, “‘we may not have an economy on
Monday.’”63 Within days, the Treasury posted a three page bailout bill on
its website that called for a $700 billion bailout of unnamed financial firms,

54

BU5.

55

Tyler Cowen, Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, at

Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 51, at 25. Money market funds typically trade at one dollar per share
unless they must recognize losses on otherwise safe short term debt. The Reserve Fund lost money on
Lehman paper and traded under one dollar precipitating a panic in money market akin to a bank run. Id.
at 24-25.
56
A Nuclear Winter?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20-26, 2008, at 90.
57
Id.
58
Justin Fox, Why the Government Wouldn’t Let AIG Fail, TIME.COM, Sept. 16, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1841699,00.html.
59
Paritosh Bansal, Goldman's Share of AIG Bailout Money Draws Fire, REUTERS.COM, Mar. 17,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN1712706420090317.
60
Id.
61
Joshua Zumbrun, What AIG Really Owes Taxpayers, FORBES.COM, Sept. 1, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/01/aig-bailouts-fed-business-washington-aig.html.
62
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008) (available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm). Apparently, the government
insisted that the CEO of AIG resign as part of the bailout. James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 21, 2009, at 59, 73.
63
Joe Nocera, As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1
(quoting Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke); Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television
broadcast Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/etc/synopsis.
html.
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to be administered solely by the Treasury, free of all oversight.64 When
asked the basis of the $700 billion amount, a Treasury official stated that
they wanted it to be a “really large number.”65 The American people
weighed in strongly against such a bill.66 This caused the House of
Representatives to pause.67 But, the Senate loaded the bill with sufficient
pork that the House ultimately succumbed and passed the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (“TARP”) on October 3, 2008.68 The legislation, hastily
conceived and passed in a panic, originally contemplated the purchase of
“troubled assets” by the Treasury.69 This original conception was
abandoned in favor of equity injections in banks and other financial firms.70
On October 13, 2008, Paulson gathered the CEOs of the nation’s largest
financial firms and forced them to accept billions in government aid,
whether they desired the aid or not, and whether they needed the aid or
not.71 As of mid-2009, the government’s net investment in the financial
sector pursuant to the TARP program exceeded $248.8 billion.72
Even this proved insufficient. Citigroup continued to flounder even
after receiving $25 billion in TARP funds. On November 23, 2008, the
Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC agreed to inject another $20 billion from
the TARP funds and essentially guaranteed the value of $306 billion of
Citigroup’s assets.73 The Treasury did not negotiate for any changes in
management and only received warrants and preferred stock in exchange.74
Commentators suggested that “[t]he $306 billion guarantee was an

64
Treasury’s Bailout Proposal, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 20, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/
20/news/economy/treasury_proposal/index.htm.
65
Brian Wingfield & Josh Zumbrun, Bad News for the Bailout, FORBES.COM, Sept. 23, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/23/bailout-paulson-congress-biz-beltway-cx_jz_bw_0923bailout.html.
66
Matthew Benjamin, Americans Oppose Bailouts, Favor Obama to Handle Market Crisis,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aYK_5_
fV5D4M.
67
A Shock from the House, ECONOMIST.COM, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/
unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12326538.
68
The Bail-Out Becomes Law, but Will It Work?, ECONOMIST.COM, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12367649. See also Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101-136, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5201).
69
Nocera, supra note 63, at A1.
70
More Rabbits from the Hat, ECONOMIST.COM, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/
unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12597500.
71
Paulson Forced Banks to Take TARP Money: Documents, CNBC.COM, May 9, 2009,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/30745687. The government did not replace any senior management of the
banks receiving federal funds. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Actions to Protect the U.S. Economy (October 14, 2008) (available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/archives/200810.html).
72
Jon Hilsenrath, Bailouts Yield Returns Amid Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2009, at A10.
73
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and the
FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008) (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1287.htm). The
government did not replace senior management nor negotiate any reduction in their compensation. See
id.
74
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Summary of Terms: Eligible Asset Guarantee, Nov. 23,
2008, (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/cititermsheet_112308.pdf).
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undisguised gift.”75 On February 27, 2009, the Treasury further acted to
strengthen Citigroup’s capital structure by agreeing to convert $25 billion in
preferred shares to common equity shares.76 There is some confusion
regarding the cost thus far of bailing out Citigroup.77 On one hand, the
government is sitting on an $11 billion profit from its common shares.78 On
the other hand, the ultimate cost of the government’s guarantee of asset
values is uncertain at best.79 This constituted the first use of the FDIC
insurance funds to bail out a bank during the 2008-2009 crisis and it acted
pursuant to its emergency authority to address systemic risk.80
Bank of America presented similar problems (particularly after its
acquisition of Merrill Lynch in mid-September of 2008), notwithstanding
the government’s initial injection of $25 billion in the fall of 2008.81 On
January 16, 2009, the government announced that it would inject a further
$20 billion into Bank of America and guarantee the value of essentially
$118 billion in loans in exchange for preferred shares.82 Bank of America
ultimately decided not to take advantage of the asset guarantee program and
has resisted paying the fees associated with the program.83 As of early fall
of 2009, Bank of America was negotiating to repay part of its TARP money
and end the asset guarantee.84 Thus, it is impossible to calculate the losses
from these additional Bank of America bailouts. The FDIC, which acted in
concert with the Fed and the Department of the Treasury, again based its
actions on the systemic risk exception to limits on its use of deposit
insurance funds.85
There were many additional government efforts to bail out the
financial sector. For example, the government has expended $96 billion to
75
Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2009, at WK10.
76
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Participation in Citigroup’s
Exchange Offering (Feb. 27, 2009) (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg41.htm).
77
The TARP inspector general recently announced plans to audit the Citigroup bailout. Alister
Bull, TARP Special Inspector to Audit Citi Guarantee, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.
reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN1948552220090819.
78
Patrick Jenkins & Francesco Guerrera, Bank Bail-Outs Weigh on Some States, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88e0d226-901e-11de-bc59-00144feabdc0.html.
79
David Olive, Bailout Profit Not Adding Up, THESTAR.COM, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.thestar.
com/columnists/article/691545.
80
Silva, supra note 19, at 129 (noting that under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) the FDIC may
expend insurance funds to protect other than insured depositors).
81
Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Bank of America to Get Billions in U.S. Aid: Sides Finalizing Terms for
Fresh Bailout Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2009, at A1.
82
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC Provide Assistance to
Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009) (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1356.htm). The
government did not replace senior management nor reduce their compensation rights. See id.
83
David Mildenberg & Rebecca Christie, Bank of America Said to Balk at Paying Backstop Fee
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, July 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=agE.cyK752sU.
84
David Mildenberg & Jeran Wittenstein, Bank of America May Repay U.S. Aid, End Loss-Sharing
Accord, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
ax2wBt9xSau0.
85
Silva, supra note 19, at 129.
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prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored entities
that were subject to enhanced government regulation and were always
viewed as implicitly backed by the U.S. government.86 The failure of these
two entities would have destabilized the housing market and led to huge
losses to the financial sector.87 In fact, it is fair to say that without these two
entities the real estate market would cease to function.88 Further, the FDIC
guaranteed all bank debt (under the “Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program”), giving banks access to funds at a lower cost. 89 As of September
4, 2009, the FDIC guaranteed $304 billion of bank debt.90 The Fed also
plans to purchase $1.45 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and has
purchased $740 billion to date.91 This means the Fed is the largest purchaser
of mortgages in the world.92 All of this activity effectively protected banks
from losses on their holdings of mortgage securities and enhanced bank
profitability.
The financial sector also benefited from changes in accounting
standards. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) is
responsible for promulgating accounting standards.93 Yet, the FASB’s
authority is always subject to Congressional power.94 In the heat of the
financial crisis the FASB was pressured by Congress and lobbied by the
financial industry to revamp market accounting and to allow banks greater
discretion in valuing assets.95 This materially buoyed profits at financial
firms and shored up their capital.96 In the first quarter of 2009, experts
estimate that bank earnings would have been 42% lower without the
changes; in the second quarter bank profitability would have declined
14%.97 This amounted to a stealth bailout.
All of this bailout activity concentrated economic power primarily
86
Rick Newman, 5 Bailouts That Did Some Good, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 4, 2009,
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/flowchart/2009/09/04/5-bailouts-that-did-some-good.html.
87
For example, 90% of all home mortgages are currently funded or guaranteed by the government,
including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Dina ElBoghdady, Mortgage Market
Bound by Major U.S. Role, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2009, at A01.
88
Newman, supra note 86.
89
Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity (Oct. 14, 2008)
(available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html).
90
Damien Paletta & Mark Gongloff, Banks Face Loss of Debt Guarantee, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10,
2009, at A2.
91
Mark Gongloff, MBS—Fed's Inflation-Fighting Weapon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at C1.
92
Id. In the run-up to the election of 2008, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, which serves as a
lender of last resort, injected hundreds of billions into various federally chartered thrifts, an effort which
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac joined. This “shadow bailout” kept the mortgage market afloat, at an
unknown future cost. Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put,”
President Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown, 38 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3, 25-27 (2009).
93
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, LAW & ACCOUNTING: CASES AND MATERIALS 8-12 (2005).
94
Id.
95
Ian Katz & Jesse Westbrook, Mark-to-Market Lobby Buoys Bank Profits 20% as FASB May Say
Yes, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=
awSxPMGzDW38.
96
Michael Rapoport, A Comprehensive View on Bank Profits, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2009, at C14.
97
Id.
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in the hands of Secretary of the Treasury, Hank Paulson.98 Paulson was the
latest of a long line of former Goldman Sachs CEOs to assume high profile
government positions, particularly as Treasury Secretary.99 Throughout the
fall of 2008, he exercised unprecedented power over the economy, largely
free of congressional or other oversight.100 This led to charges of
inappropriate political influence and even crony capitalism—particularly
with respect to the bailout of AIG which richly benefitted Goldman
Sachs.101 The New York Times obtained records under the Freedom of
Information Act showing that Paulson spoke to the current CEO of Goldman
Sachs twenty-four times during the week of the AIG bailout.102 Closely
associated charges of inconsistency and arbitrary action were leveled against
Paulson’s actions; John Taylor, a Stanford economics professor, argued that
the “‘lack of a predictable framework for intervention’” resulted in market
uncertainty.103 “The pattern of government intervention in the past year is at
times bewildering. . . . . Creeping uncertainty of this sort would inevitably
slow and distort the economy.”104 In short, the rule of man replaced the rule
of law in the American economy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
All of this was unprecedented.105 Yet, Paulson proceeded to
disburse hundreds of billions of dollars with few, if any, controls or
oversight.106 The government vastly overpaid for the rights and shares
purchased; in fact, the Congressional Oversight Panel that reviewed the
initial TARP transactions found that the Treasury received assets worth $66
for every $100 spent.107 The money often went to banks that did not want or
need the funds, as well as to unscrupulous banks.108 There were no
requirements imposed on the use of the funds, and little or no effort was
made to trace the use of the funds.109 Banks that received funds
subsequently used funds to buy competitors, to host golf junkets, or
redecorate their offices.110 The Attorney General of New York issued a
report showing that $32.5 billion was paid out in bonuses to senior
executives even while losses mounted and firms took in government
98

President Hank, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2008, at 46.
Id.
For example, Paulson largely decided whether long-time Goldman rivals such as Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers survived. Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., Paulson’s Calls to Goldman
Tested Ethics During Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A1.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Krishna Guha, Paulson Rues Shortage of Firepower as Battle Raged, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/247f263a-d6aa-11dd-9bf7-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 (quoting
Stanford professor, John Taylor).
104
William D. Cohan, An Offer He Couldn’t Refuse, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2009, at 62.
105
Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Good Billions After Bad, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2009, at 206.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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Id.
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assistance.111 Finally, there was no effort to assure that banks receiving
bailout monies could survive; stress-testing was not required until spring of
2009, well after hundreds of billions had been expended.112 The intent of all
the bailouts seems lost—the money disbursed did little to free up credit
markets.
It is virtually impossible at this date to calculate the final net loss to
the taxpayer from these government interventions. There is reason to think
that any estimate as of the date of this writing is apt to be too low. The
commercial real estate debacle is just getting started.113 The government has
failed to arrest the collapse of the residential real estate market or to
materially slow the rate of real estate foreclosures.114 Indeed, while the
government expended hundreds of billions in bailout funds for large banks,
and still has $2.2 trillion in bailout loans outstanding, its mortgage relief
program disbursed a relatively paltry sum of $22 billion115 to help stem a
flood of foreclosures that some sources estimate at thirteen million over the
next five years.116 In the spring of 2009, Harvard economist, Kenneth
Rogoff, estimated the hole in the financial system to be $2 trillion and
suggested that taxpayers could pay $1 trillion without succeeding in
recapitalizing the financial sector appropriately.117 Combined with lost
GDP, it seems certain the bailouts will be a multi-trillion dollar catastrophe.
The next section will show that macroeconomic science suggested
that these programs would ultimately fail to reignite lending, and by
extension, economic growth. Moreover, economists and other scholars
specifically warned that distorted incentives implicit in TBTF would lead to
financial instability, in the first instance, and that the fact that the
government extended assistance to firms teetering towards bankruptcy
would further distort incentives well into the future.

111

Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Bankers' Bonuses Beat Earnings as Industry Imploded, WASH. POST,
July 31, 2009, at A18.
112
See Fredrick Tung, The Great Bailout of 2008-2009, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 335
(2009).
113
Nick Timiraos & Jessica Holzer, Corus Bank Is the Latest to Be Seized by Regulators, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 12, 2009, at B1.
114
Robert Daniel, U.S. Aug. Foreclosures Off 1% from July, up 18% vs. Year Ago,
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-foreclosures-off-1-vs-july-upvs-year-ago-2009-09-10.
115
David Goldman, Bailout Tracker: What's Going, What's Coming, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 11,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/11/news/economy/bailout_repayment_tracker/?postversion=
2009091113.
116
Editorial, After the Fall Our View of the Economic Meltdown One Year Later: How Much Has
Changed?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.stltoday.com/
blogzone/the-platform/published-editorials/2009/09/after-the-fall-the-economic-meltdown-one-year-on/.
117
Kenneth Rogoff, Rogoff: Stop the Financial Bleeding, BOSTON.COM, May 10, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/globe100/globe_100_2009/articles/rogoff_stop_the_financial_ble
eding/.
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II. THE MACROECONOMICS OF BAILOUTS
Economists greeted the bailouts with intense skepticism.118
According to former Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”), Simon Johnson, the financial sector has become too politically
powerful.119 Their political power contributed to the onset of the subprime
crisis and is now impeding a rational government response.120 Specifically,
Johnson maintains that the terms of the TARP capital infusions were
“grossly favorable to the banks themselves.”121 Johnson claims that this
reality mirrors that of many developing nations facing a financial crisis.122
Unfortunately, too often, those nations could not wrest control of the
financial sector from the reckless financial elites that engineered the crisis
due to their political power.123 Johnson maintains that the “economic
solution is seldom very hard to work out.”124 It requires only the political
will to “scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
process” whereby shareholders and unsecured creditors are wiped out, failed
management is terminated, and the banks (with deleveraged balance sheets)
are sold off (perhaps piecemeal) into the private sector.125 “The main
advantage is immediate recognition of the problem so that it can be solved
before it grows worse.”126 Finally, Johnson argues that because “oversize[d]
institutions disproportionately influence public policy,” banks must be
118
E.g., Nouriel Roubini, Public Losses for Private Gain, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Sept. 18, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/18/marketturmoil.creditcrunch
(denouncing
“hypocrites who spewed . . . laissez-faire . . . capitalism” and “allowed the biggest debt bubble ever to
fester without any control, and have caused the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression” now
overseeing “the biggest government intervention . . . in the recent history of humanity, all for the benefit
of the rich and the well connected”).
119
Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46.
120
Johnson notes that political influence has been central to the crisis:

elite business interests . . . played a central role in creating the crisis, making everlarger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable
collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely
the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its
nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
Id. at 49.
121
Id. at 53.
122
The IMF economists echo former chief IMF economist Simon Johnson:
Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one
simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and
took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies
commonly form a tight-knit . . . oligarchy, running the country rather like a profitseeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders . . . . They
reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them
to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
Id. at 47-48.
123
Id. at 48.
124
Id. at 47.
125
Johnson, supra note 119, at 54.
126
Id.
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prevented from ever again being too-big-to-fail; thus, “banks that remain in
private hands must be subject to size limitations.”127
Other high profile economists joined the chorus of adverse
commentary.128 Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, bemoaned the policies that
allowed the “zombie banks” to continue to operate under impaired capital
conditions.129 He too argues in favor of FDIC seizure.130 Another Nobel
Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, claims that the bailouts amount to “ersatz
capitalism” whereby gains are privatized but losses are socialized.131 Such a
reality will create “perverse incentives, worse even than the ones that got us
into the mess.”132 He points out that in the past the government, through the
FDIC, seized large banks, including Continental Illinois in the 1980s.133
Stiglitz argues that the government could have generated $7 trillion in
loans134 if it had diverted the TARP money to the creation of a “good bank,”
which would be stripped of the problem bank assets that have proven so
troublesome.135
Recently, two IMF economists studied financial crises around the
world from 1970 through 2007.136 They found that the best economic policy
for resolving such crises is cognizant of the large costs involved in
redirecting a nation’s wealth from taxpayers to financial firms and their
creditors.137 These costs include the amount transferred to banks plus the
misallocations of capital and distorted incentives that can harm GDP for
years.138 Moreover, they found that any delay in resolving a financial crisis

127

Id. at 56.
Jack Willoughby, Tearing into the Fed and Treasury Plans, BARRON’S, Oct. 27, 2008, at 52
(interview of pre-eminent economist Anna Schwartz).
129
Krugman, supra note 23, at A27.
130
Id.
131
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Joseph E. Stiglitz, How to Fail to Recover, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20090316/how-to-fail-to-recover.htm.
135
Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Bank Bailout That Works, THE NATION, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20090323/stiglitz/single. A good bank has assets and liabilities that have certain
value using market prices. Management can therefore be confident the bank's capital and support new
lending. Id. Other high profile economists joined in these critiques. See Rogoff, supra note 117, at A14
(“We need to put most of the major financial institutions through accelerated bankruptcy. We're not
going to get normal lending until we do that. We also need to lay down a regulatory framework so this
doesn't happen again.”); Paul Romer, Let's Start Brand New Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A13
(“If the TARP funds go to existing banks, much of them will end up stuck in financial institutions that
are still bad after the transfer. We know from the previous round of TARP that giving more capital to
bad banks generates very little net new lending.”).
136
Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Bank Crises: A New Database 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/08/224, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/
wp08224.pdf.
137
Id. at 3 (noting that “sound policy approaches to financial crises [include] recognition that policy
responses that reallocate wealth toward banks and debtors and away from taxpayers face” costs).
138
Id. (concluding that costs include the amount of “taxpayers’ wealth that is spent on financial
assistance and indirect costs from misallocations of capital and distortions to incentives that may result”).
128
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is often very costly as insolvent firms tend to become more insolvent.139
Instead, authorities must act with speed and shutter hopelessly insolvent
firms while reserving assistance for those firms that can survive.140
Forbearance results in greater costs and increased credit contraction.141
Finally, help for distressed borrowers is essential for the successful
resolution of bank crises.142 Those nations that fail to pursue these often
politically painful steps frequently suffer prolonged stagnation.143
Much of the learning regarding appropriate policy responses to a
financial crisis emanates from the experience of Japan over the last twenty
years. Japan attempted to bail out its banks and succeeded in creating
zombie firms which sapped economic growth.144 Japan’s problems started
with a bursting real estate bubble and a bursting stock market bubble leading
to large losses for the Japanese financial sector.145 This led to a typical
credit crunch, as banks and other financial institutions pared risk.146
However, Japan exacerbated the credit crunch by keeping zombie banks
afloat; such banks face incentives to continue lending to zombie firms rather
than recognizing losses that could tip the banks into insolvency.147 Zombie
firms, in turn, depress investment, employment growth, and productivity
sector-wide as even non-zombie firms struggle to compete against the
zombie firms.148 As professors Hoshi and Kashyap conclude: “We believe
that the depressed restructuring that accompanied the financial crisis has left
Japan with a dysfunctional banking system that misallocates funds and a
perverted industrial structure in which subsidized inefficient firms are
139
Id. at 4 (“Existing empirical research has shown that providing assistance to banks and their
borrowers can be counterproductive, resulting in increased losses to banks, which often abuse
forbearance to take unproductive risks at government expense.”).
140
Id. at 30 (“A successful bank recapitalization program tends to be selective in its financial
assistance to banks, specifies clear quantifiable rules that limit access to preferred stock assistance, and
enacts capital regulation that establishes meaningful standards for risk-based capital.”).
141
Id. at 4 (“The typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling
tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and even more severe credit supply contraction and economic
decline than would have occurred in the absence of forbearance.”).
142
Laeven & Valencia, supra note 136, at 31 (“To relieve indebted [borrowers] . . . from financial
stress and restore their balance sheets to health, intervention in the form of targeted debt relief programs
to distressed borrowers and corporate restructuring programs appear most successful. Such programs . . .
tend to be most successful when they are well-targeted with adequate safeguards attached.”).
143
Id. at 30 (“Above all, speed appears of the essence. As soon as a large part of the financial
system is deemed insolvent and has reached systemic crisis proportions, bank losses should be
recognized . . . and steps should be taken to ensure that financial institutions are adequately
capitalized.”).
144
James Baker, How Washington Can Prevent ‘Zombie Banks’, FT.COM, Mar. 1, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b3f299a6-0697-11de-ab0f-000077b07658.html.
145
Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Japan’s Financial Crisis and Economic Stagnation, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2004, at 5-6.
146
Id. at 6-7.
147
Id. at 14-15, 18 (citing Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives
and the Misallocation of Capital in Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1144, 1165 (2005) (finding that perverse
incentives facing potentially insolvent banks caused a misallocation of credit that exacerbated economic
malaise and contributed to Japan’s lost decade of economic stagnation).
148
See Caballero, supra note 14, at 1971-72.
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crowding out potentially profitable ones.”149 In short, the longer the zombie
banks operate, the more damage they inflict upon the economy, and the
sooner they are “shuttered,” the better for the economy.150
Strong evidence demonstrates that zombie banks plague the U.S.
economy. For example, notwithstanding the prodigious government
subsidies discussed above, “[m]ore than 150 publicly traded U.S. lenders
own nonperforming loans that equal 5 percent or more of their holdings, a
level that former regulators say can wipe out a bank’s equity and threaten its
survival.”151 For its part, the FDIC has recently expanded its list of troubled
banks to more than 400.152 In addition, regulators subjected nineteen of the
nation’s largest banks to “stress tests” and found that ten of those banks
needed to add $75 billion in new capital to meet $599 billion in losses
projected over the next two years—and that was after the banks negotiated
downward adjustments to capital needs of $68 billion.153 Experts suggest
that the recent changes in mark-to-market accounting standards, discussed
above, are also operating to mask bank insolvency and create illusory
profits.154 An influential business consulting firm, McKinsey & Co.,
recently reported that while the credit securities crisis is winding down, the
bank loan portfolio crisis is just starting—because credit securities were
marked to market while loan portfolios are written down only upon actual
default.155 McKinsey’s research suggests that total credit losses from U.S.
debt will be between $2.5 trillion and $3.5 trillion, of which only $1 trillion
have been recognized.156 Consequently, by any reasonable measure the
nation’s financial sector is deeply troubled.
These troubles have economic impact. McKinsey states that “[e]ven
the strongest of the major US banks face a challenging environment for the
foreseeable future.”157 Basically the “entire industry is now dependent on
government support of all kinds, ranging from low-cost funding . . . to debt
guarantees, asset guarantees, and capital injections.”158 This means that a
significant portion of the industry consists of zombie banks—banks that are
149

Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 145, at 24.
Caballero, supra note 15, at 1972.
Ari Levy, Toxic Loans Topping 5% May Push 150 Banks to Point of No Return,
Bloomberg.com, Aug. 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
aTTT9jivRIWE.
152
Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Banks on Sick List Top 400: Industry’s Health Slides as Bad
Loans Pile Up, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2009, at A1.
153
David Enrich et al., Banks Won Concessions on Tests: Fed Cut Billions off Some Initial CapitalShortfall Estimates, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, at A1.
154
Yalman Onaran, Bank Profits from Accounting Rules Masking Looming Loan Losses,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=
alC3LxSjomZ8.
155
Lowell Bryan & Toos Daruvala, What’s Next for US Banks, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, June 2009,
at 1, available at http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Whats_next_for_US_banks_2368.
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Id. at 3.
157
Id. at 6.
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insolvent but for government subsidies and lifelines.159 Zombie banks harm
the entire financial sector, even non-zombie firms, because they will
naturally use their government subsidies to support higher deposit rates and
lower interest costs, thereby squeezing industry profit margins.160 Right
now zombie banks are “irrationally” risk-averse and are hoarding capital.161
Zombie banks also will rationally fear government restrictions on their
operations (especially, in a CEO primacy regime of corporate governance,
those relating to executive compensation) and hoard capital in order to repay
the government.162 They will also hoard capital to avert government
intervention if they know large losses are imminent.163 Thus, these firms
become insolvency sponges, sucking in vast capital just to remain viable.
These zombie banks have already harmed the U.S. economy. The
money that the government pumped into the financial sector failed to
reignite lending.164 According to a New York Times survey of investor
conferences, bankers frankly admitted they were more interested in hoarding
capital or making acquisitions than expanding lending.165 Moreover,
because the government gave the most money to the most insolvent banks,
much of the money went to fill holes in balance sheets to alleviate their
insolvency; thus, lending fell by twice the amount at banks that received
TARP funds relative to banks that did not receive such funds.166 The
Federal Reserve reports that banks have long been tightening their credit
standards, and this has continued unabated since the disbursement of the
TARP funds.167 The FDIC depicts in the following chart the resulting
contraction in bank lending:168
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William Safire, Zombie Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at MM26.
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CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES, Jan. 1987, at 77, 78.
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Willem Buiter, Time to Take Banks into Full Public Ownership, http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/
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Feldstein, supra note 27.
164
David Enrich et al., Bank Lending Keeps Dropping: Analysis of Treasury Data Paints Starker
Picture Than Official Government Snapshots, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2009, at A1.
165
Mike McIntire, Bailout Is a Windfall to Banks, If Not to Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009,
at A1.
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Binyamin Appelbaum, Despite Federal Aid, Many Banks Fail to Revive Lending, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/
AR2009020203338_pf.html. It can be difficult to determine if declining loan volume is the result of
falling demand for loans or a pullback in supply by newly risk-averse banks seeking to preserve capital,
particularly in the context of a general economic contraction. In prior episodes of lending contraction,
however, economists have found that capital constrained institutions shrank lending more than wellcapitalized banks. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, The Credit Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be,
27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 625, 636-37 (1995).
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Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.. The October 2009 Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices 1-2 (Nov. 9, 2009) (available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200911/fullreport.pdf). The Fed also reports that banks
raised the cost of capital continuously since late 2007, relative to the bank cost of funds. Id. at 6. If
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The above chart demonstrates, that in fact, bank lending sharply
contracted immediately following the massive government sponsored
bailouts. It is difficult to determine if the contraction of lending led to the
contraction in the U.S. economy or if the causation runs in the opposite
direction. Nevertheless, the contraction in GDP tracks the contraction in
lending very tightly, rather than preceding it: GDP turned negative in third
quarter of 2008 and plunged the next two quarters.169 Therefore, it is
probable that the contraction in lending caused the contraction in GDP.
Meanwhile, there is also powerful evidence that the banks have used
the funds to hoard capital. According to following Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis chart, reserves held at the Federal Reserve Banks nationwide
exploded at the time the TARP funds were disbursed:170

169
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Real GDP, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/xcharts/public/
popup.cfm?p=chart_detail&rs_id=7 (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
170
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Graph, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/
?s[1][id]=WRESBAL (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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Instead of lending money, the banks are hoarding capital, as
reflected in the massive build-up of reserve balances with Federal Reserve
Banks. Banks are required to maintain reserve balances; however, excess
reserve balances exploded immediately following the government bailout
efforts,171 and as of late July of 2009, banks held $794 billion in excess
reserves.172 As economists Aaron Edlin and Dwight Jaffee put it: “Thars the
problem folks.”173 Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that this capital
hoarding is a material factor slowing the economy today, and in the longer
term, threatens to cause higher inflation when banks finally do regain
confidence in their balance sheets and the economy.174
Certainly, policymakers should be credited for averting a repeat of
the Great Depression.175 Yet, the extraordinary efforts of policymakers
around the world as well as in the U.S. have not been costless:
“governments have been spending and borrowing like never before.”176 In
the U.S. total commitments exceed $12 trillion, and actual expenditures

171

1-2.

Aaron S. Edlin & Dwight M. Jaffee, Show Me the Money, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, March 2009, at

172
FEDERAL RESERVE, AGGREGATE RESERVES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS & THE MONETARY
BASE 1 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/h3.pdf.
173
Edlin & Jaffe, supra note 171, at 2.
174
Nouriel Roubini, The Spend-and-Borrow Economy, FORBES.COM, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.
forbes.com/2009/08/26/stimulus-recession-fiscal-monetary-liquidity-taxes-opinions-columnists-nourielroubini.html.
175
Id. (“In the last few months the world economy has been saved from a near-depression. That feat
has been achieved by a range of extraordinary government stimulus measures . . . governments have
pumped liquidity, slashed policy rates, cut taxes, primed demand and ring-fenced and back-stopped the
financial system.”).
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amount to $4 trillion.177 Governments have also resorted to printing money,
which is never costless.178 Without this massive government intervention
the economy would have suffered “headlong GDP contraction.”179 Not even
the U.S. government can afford to accumulate debt and expand its monetary
base (which includes the reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve
Banks) at such a furious rate without adverse consequences.180 The debt
burden of the U.S. is now projected to double, to 80% of GDP by 2014,
which “amounts to a fiscal train wreck” that could cause creditors to
demand higher risk premia on U.S. obligations.181 Additionally, when banks
cease to hoard capital and make loans, the money supply will expand rapidly
and therefore threaten inflation.182 In other words, the U.S. faces the
potential of higher interest rates and higher inflation as a result of the
excessively costly and ill-tailored bailouts of 2008-2009.
Economists suggested other alternatives to the subprime bailouts.
As mentioned, a number of economists have suggested the creation of a
well-capitalized “good bank” rather than government efforts to plug the vast
insolvency holes now plaguing the bailed-out banks.183 Others suggest that
instead of trying to keep fundamentally insolvent financial institutions afloat
with government money (saving their unsecured creditors and their
managers the horrors of bankruptcy or FDIC reorganization), the
government create a streamlined bankruptcy regime.184 Creditors would
swap into equity positions and be denied government funds.185 The
government could provide prepackaged bankruptcy terms aimed at
achieving a rapid resolution of the bank’s insolvency.186 The result would
be recapitalized banks, ready to lend, at no cost to the taxpayer.187 The
overarching point is that lending could have been restored without stuffing
billions, even trillions, into the pockets of creditors who never bargained for
a government guarantee.
Thus, the bailouts of 2008-2009 suffer from numerous and serious
macroeconomic flaws. First, the bailouts failed to reignite lending and
stabilize the economy and instead led to a historic capital hoarding of U.S.
government funds. Second, the bailouts left current management of banks
largely intact and protected their compensation agreements, creating
incentives for managers to conceal losses and keep their firms afloat so that
177
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more compensation payments will be forthcoming. Third, the bailouts did
not shutter hopelessly insolvent firms, which means that at some firms,
losses are likely to expand. Fourth, the bailouts did not materially assist
distressed borrowers so as to contain future losses. Fifth, and most
importantly, the government clearly affirmed it would rescue certain
financial firms, and thereby, created powerful incentives for both managers
and creditors to gorge on risk and propagate new financial crises. The
bailouts of 2008-2009 simply do not enjoy much support from the world of
macroeconomics.188 In the end, this may be the most massive misallocation
of social wealth in history, particularly in light of the obvious social needs
of our citizenry—ranging from education to healthcare.189
Nor have economists and business commentators greeted the
Obama Administration’s reform efforts with much warmth.190 The
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Gary Stern, states
that “the [Obama Administration’s] proposal fails to come to grips with
TBTF and therefore leaves the financial system considerably more
vulnerable than it needs to be to future bouts of instability.”191 The core
problem with the Administration’s proposal is that “there is nothing in the . .
. proposal designed to put creditors of large, systemically important
financial institutions at risk of loss.”192 According to the Wall Street
Journal: “Team Obama seeks to codify the bailout policies of the last 18
months.”193 Columbia University Professor Joseph Stiglitz suggests: “the
too-big-to-fail banks have become even bigger. . . . [and] [t]he problems are
worse than they were in 2007 before the crisis.”194 He argues that the
political power of the financial sector is the cause of this “outrage.”195
188
The Congressional Oversight Panel also found that successful resolution of financial crises
required swift action, the termination of managers, transparency, and the willingness to let hopelessly
insolvent banks to fail. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, APRIL OVERSIGHT, ASSESSING TREASURY’S
STRATEGY: SIX MONTHS OF TARP 5, 70 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop040709-report.pdf.
189
The Congressional Oversight Panel found that while the government’s bailout efforts succeeded
in averting a calamity, it did so at the risk of a “significant long run cost to the . . . economy.” Moreover,
the government’s prodigious efforts failed to reignite lending, finding that credit availability, the
“lifeblood of the economy, remains low.” CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT,
TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 112-113 (2009),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-120909-report.pdf.
190
The Obama Treasury Department released a white paper explaining the full breadth of their
reform efforts. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION
2-5 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. In addition it
has proposed legislation. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New
Foundation, http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/regulatoryreform/ ( last visited Oct. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Proposed Legislation] (listing the proposed legislation).
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Gary Stern, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks to Helena Business Leaders
7 (July 9, 2009) (available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/Stern07-09-09.pdf).
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BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=
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Former Fed Chair Paul Volcker, among others, advised the Administration
to reduce the size of TBTF banks.196 Nevertheless, the Administration’s
proposal simply identifies banks that are deemed TBTF and subjects them to
enhanced regulation, while explicitly expanding the TBTF subsidy to more
and larger financial institutions.197
III. SUBPRIME BAILOUT LAW
On many levels the entire subprime fiasco resulted from a failure of
law. One key example is the perverse incentives the law created under the
auspices of the pseudo-legal doctrine of TBTF.198 This legal monstrosity,
which always relied on political extortion over formal law, held that major
firms (or at least some undefined set of major firms) would be effectively
guaranteed against insolvency by the U.S. government.199
American law had long provided two insolvency regimes: one for
banks and another for ordinary commercial enterprises.200 If a bank fails (or
becomes “critically undercapitalized”), then the FDIC seizes control and
ousts management.201 Typically, the FDIC pays off insured depositors and
therefore enjoys priority in the distribution of assets with uninsured
depositors.202 General unsecured creditors and shareholders are typically
last in priority and are thus not likely to fare well.203 However, Congress
has authorized the FDIC to make payments to unsecured claimants based
upon estimated recoveries in order to provide liquidity for such claims.204
The failure of Washington Mutual in September of 2008 illustrates the
soundness of this resolution regime.205 Although it was the largest bank
failure in history, it cost the government insurance fund nothing, and its
assets were immediately transferred to another bank.206 While general
unsecured creditors took large losses, there is little evidence that its failure
196
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Stern, supra note 191, at 5 (claiming credit for recognizing “in a timely way that TBTF was a
severe and growing problem, that it had not been addressed effectively by the FDICIA legislation of
1991, and that it would eventually and inevitably lead to excessive risk-taking, turmoil in financial
markets, and disruption in the economy,” unlike most regulators and scholars).
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Experts typically define the doctrine of TBTF to mean that certain firms will be guaranteed
against failure by government lifelines because policy makers find such firms too important
economically to permit failure. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 1. The September 18, 2009
meeting with Congressional leaders may be a historic example of political extortion—when in the heat of
the election the Fed Chair told the Congress that unless a massive bailout was passed immediately “we
may not have an economy on Monday.” Nocera, supra note 63, at A1.
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Id. at 156 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (b)(1)(E) (2004)).
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Id. General unsecured creditors may receive protection in cases where the failure to provide
such protection results in systemic risk. Id. at 161, 165.
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led to more widespread instability.207
A second regime for managing insolvency is bankruptcy, which
applies to all firms other than banks. Bankruptcy can be triggered at the
instance of creditors or the firm itself.208 Unsecured creditors typically fare
poorly in bankruptcy--their claims are subject to an automatic stay and are
usually paid out in the form of newly issued securities by the reorganized
firm.209 Thus, bankruptcy proceedings eliminate issues of moral hazard as
unsecured creditors are put at risk of loss, and management contracts are
treated as just another creditor claim.210 On the other hand, bankruptcy
should not be confused with liquidation; in fact, Chapter 11 reorganization
specifically promotes the ongoing operations of the firm by staying
collection activity (which may otherwise prove disruptive) and making
special financing available.211 Neither bankruptcy nor FDIC receivership
law contemplated the massive bailouts of 2008-2009.
In 1991, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”).212 At the time, legislative
history showed that Congress “strongly intends that the too-big-to-fail
policy is hereby abolished.”213 The FDICIA did apparently narrow the
circumstances under which the FDIC and the Fed could extend assistance to
open banks--or at least many commentators so concluded.214 Nevertheless,
even after the FDICIA, the FDIC retained power to protect uninsured
creditors to avert “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability.”215 The Fed also still had the power to open the discount
window to non-banks.216 This is the provision that the Fed relied upon in
extending $30 billion in assistance in connection with the bailout and sale of
Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase,217 as well as the bailout of AIG.218 The
207
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elimination of TBTF under FDICIA).
215
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2006). In 1984, in connection with the bailout of Continental
Illinois Bank, the FDIC extended $6 billion in loans, cash and capital injections. Silva, supra note 19, at
121.
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12 U.S.C. § 343 (“In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal
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accommodations from other banking institutions.”).
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Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Minutes 1 (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf.
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Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve. Sys., Authorization to the Federal Reserve
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regulatory agencies simply wielded their power in historically
unprecedented ways to achieve results without regard to legal expectations.
The Fed had never used its power to open the discount window to non-banks
on the scale of the AIG or Bear Stearns bailouts.219 The primary antecedent
for the FDIC’s use of deposit insurance funds for other than insured deposits
similarly lacked precedent in frequency as well as scope—the bailout of
Continental Illinois was relatively puny compared to the bailouts of 20082009.220 Thus, although Congressional abolition of TBTF seems to have
always been overstated, the bailouts of 2008-2009 were nevertheless nearly
inconceivable under law.
Of course, Congress could bail out banks simply by changing the
law, which they did with the enactment of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).221 This permitted far vaster bailouts
with an enhanced veneer of legitimacy than the bailouts that had occurred
before October of 2008. More than any other government action, this huge
bailout bill—which exceeded $700 billion—demonstrated that when
political leaders are faced with either the risk of economic catastrophe or
massive government support for teetering financial giants, they will choose
to spend rather than try to explain later.222 The role of campaign
contributions cannot be ignored.223 Moreover, the CEOs of the nation’s
largest financial firms are a small group which commands vast wealth;
theories of collective action in the political realm would predict they would
hold powerful sway over policy.224 Perhaps bailouts of large firms,
especially financial firms, are inevitable.225
Nevertheless, the bailouts of 2008-2009 were unprecedented, in
scope as well as cost. This suggests that previously the law operated to
minimize the TBTF problem relative to today. In fact, as I have argued
elsewhere, CEO power within the public corporation has expanded over
recent decades. Much of this can be credited to corporate tort reform
combined with longstanding power imbalances that CEOs enjoy over the

219
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EESA. Stewart, supra note 62, at 79.
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See OLSON, supra note 9, at 22-36 (arguing that smaller groups seeking concentrated legislative
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composition of the board, their nominal supervisors.226 Further, the law
clearly permits larger financial firms than in decades past as well as more
complex business activities. This operated to make financial firms more
interconnected as well as larger, raising the systemic risk of large failures.
Changes in law, such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act227 and the
Financial Modernization Act of 2000, contributed to these trends.228 These
legal developments appear to have increased the stakes of the TBTF
doctrine.
I posit that reforming the TBTF issue requires a durable legal
framework that imposes appropriate incentives for the key agents of the
creation of TBTF firms—CEOs.229 Efforts to regulate the risks taken by
firms that are TBTF lead to regulatory forbearance and indulgences.230 In
the current crisis, we have seen Congress itself apply pressure to relax
accounting rules.231 Once firms become TBTF, it seems unlikely that
policymakers will risk the wrath of the public if they permit the real
economy to follow the financial sector into an abyss.232 This political reality
is compounded by the access bankers enjoy as a result of their prodigious
campaign contributions.233 Moreover, many of the key regulators are likely
to be at least cognitively and culturally captured by their colleagues in the
banking industry.234 Commentators predicted that firms that were TBTF
would in fact be bailed out—and in fact they were.235 Thus relying upon
wise regulation, regulatory ambiguity, or effective regulators to spare the
costs of bailouts, financial crises, credit crunches, liquidity traps, and
distorted incentives is not likely to work.
This reality highlights the problems with current proposals for
dealing with the TBTF problem. Formalizing incentives for becoming
TBTF will simply create clearer, more powerful distortions.236 Relying on
226
Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures
for a Race to the Top, YALE J. ON REG., Summer 2007, at 313, 334 (“CEO primacy is the direct outcome
of the system of corporate governance law that devolved in the 1980s and 1990s into a dictatorship of
management, by management and for management.”).
227
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(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 6801-6827 (1999)).
229
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235
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gave lie to assumption that the government would never allow a major financial firm to enter bankruptcy.
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notes 48-55.
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enhanced regulation cannot be effective if regulators forbear.237 Recent
scholarship also suggests that identifying firms that are TBTF in advance is
very difficult.238 The problem is that the temptation to bail out large
financial firms is apt to differ from any set of firms identified in advance.239
Thus, any policy that attempts to pre-identify firms that would be rescued
(and impose enhanced regulation) is not likely to be successful.240 Finally,
there is a complete absence of empirical evidence that the disincentives from
regulatory penalties, such as enhanced capital requirements, leverage limits,
or other detriments, outweighs the cheaper capital and government
guaranteed compensation payments that attract managers to TBTF in the
first instance.241
Consequently, the key to controlling costs from firms that are TBTF
is to create the proper incentives for those who control the decisions leading
to TBTF status—the firm’s CEO who typically controls the firm’s
destiny.242 We have seen that these CEOs do not appreciate federal input
into their compensation.243 They are therefore likely to abhor having their
compensation agreements discharged as they would be in bankruptcy and
FDIC receivership.244 Under 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(e), the FDIC has the
power to set aside certain agreements.245 Compensation agreements for
237
As former St. Louis Fed President William Poole states: “Regulation itself cannot be the solution
because if regulators make mistakes, as they have in the past and will in the future, the government is
likely to again bail out banks deemed too big too fail.” William Poole, Senior Fellow at Cato Inst., Moral
Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts Address at the 27th Annual Monetary and Trade
Conference 3 (Apr. 29, 2009), (available at http://www.interdependence.org/docs/Bill-PooleSpeech.pdf).
238
James B. Thompson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Progressive Systemic
Mitigation 5, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/policydis/pdp27.pdf.
239
Id. (noting that “regulators are reluctant to allow the official failure (closure) of a distressed
financial institution under particular economic or financial market conditions if its solvency could have
been resolved under more normal conditions. Hence, conditions/context are sources of systemic
importance”).
240
Id.
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with such instruments to reduce their risk appetite. Tung, supra note 112, at 340-41. That concept is
entirely consistent with the proposal herein. Similarly, William Poole urges that deductibility of interest
be curtailed to discourage excessive leverage and that banks issue subordinated debt to impose marketbased discipline upon bank managers. Poole, supra note 237, at 17 (“These two reforms—phasing out
the deductibility of interest on business tax returns and requiring banks to maintain subordinated debt in
their capital structure—would change the incentives under which firms operate. Firms would be more
stable individually and the economy would be more stable.”).
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Since 2005, I have argued that corporate governance in the U.S. has devolved from a
shareholder primacy model to a CEO primacy model. Steven A. Ramirez, People of Color, Women, and
the Public Corporation: Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America; Can Law (and
Professionalization) Fix “Minor” Problems of Externalization, Internalization, and Governance?, 79 ST.
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federal bailout if it meant that their compensation may be compromised. Stewart, supra note 62, at 77.
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senior executives at firms that are bailed out because they are TBTF should
be similarly dischargeable. First, their own misconduct likely contributed to
the insolvency of their firms. Second, but for the government assistance,
their compensation agreements would have been worthless. Thus, there are
policy considerations at least as powerful as those supporting section
1821(e), supporting the discharge of such agreements. Most importantly,
the very existence of such a provision would powerfully deter senior
executives from seeking TBTF status.
Second, given the centrality of government subsidies to firms that
are TBTF, there is no reason that such instrumentalities of the state, with
access to vast sums of federal funding, should ever be shielded in any way
from the perpetration of securities fraud.246 Thus, the protections for those
committing securities fraud in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995247 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998248
should be eliminated for the senior officers and directors of firms that are
TBTF when they receive government funds or other assistance.249 This
would do no more than expose miscreants to the full brunt of the federal
securities laws as they existed from 1934 through 1995, when, as I have
previously pointed out, the federal securities laws seemed to operate to
minimize scandals and lower the cost of capital.250 Amending these acts is
therefore a costless means of averting the full macroeconomic horrors of
bailouts for dysfunctional firms. This is particularly so given that the onset
of federal protection of securities “fraudfeasors” has generally been
associated with corporate scandals upon corporate scandals with
extraordinarily negative macroeconomic costs.251 Simply put, the PSLRA
was a bad idea in 1995, which is particularly heinous when it operates to
protect those raiding the federal fisc.
Third, there is little reason why managers with proven track records
of crashing their firms to the point of requiring a federal bailout should
246

See In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., No. 07 Civ. 9841, 2009 WL 2610746, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) (dismissing securities fraud action against directors and officers of
Citigroup for failing to disclose extent of subprime exposure under the heightened pleading standards
which protect securities fraudfeasors under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
247
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
248
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 1260, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1998)).
249
I have argued that the PSLRA suffered from a lack of policy basis since its enactment. Steven
A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious As
Well As the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1082 (1999) (stating that the PSLRA “is a further
move toward the risky strategy of financial deregulation. The original conception of federal securities
regulation—that the nation needed federal regulation to create more stringent standards of conduct than
those prevailing under state law—seems to have been lost in the shuffle”).
250
Id. at 1085.
251
Since the passage of the PSLRA American capital markets have suffered through the Enron
calamity and related scandals, the options backdating scandals, and the subprime debacle. Ramirez,
supra note 32, at 3-4.
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retain control over such firms. Almost always managers of firms that are
TBTF only turn to the government for bailouts in the wake of excessive risk.
The bailouts of 2008-2009 were precipitated by pathetically promiscuous
risk management.252 Moreover, new management would have incentives to
recognize losses immediately, which economists recognize is the key to
reigniting new lending.253 On the other hand, there may be a need for some
managerial continuity, and it is possible that some managers are merely in
the wrong firm at the wrong time. Thus, any expenditure of government
support for firms that are TBTF should be conditioned upon the presumptive
termination of all of the senior managers and board of the failed firm. Only
senior managers that are vital to the firm’s business should be retained in
extraordinary circumstances. Certainly, the norm would be to discharge
virtually all of the inept managers that crashed the firm. In FDIC
receiverships, the FDIC legally accedes to all the powers of the board and
management.254
Fourth, regulators (weak as they may be) should be empowered to
order prudential divestitures of operations anytime a firm approaches TBTF
status.255 I do not propose this reform because of faith in regulators.
Instead, if operations can be subject to divestiture, there is less incentive for
such acquisitions in the first instance.256 Creditors will see that such
acquisitions are exposing firms to the penalties of being TBTF. Thus, they
will naturally view such divestitures as imposing a real risk of non-payment
because managers would react to divestures by slimming down their firms
or facing sanctions.257 Meanwhile, if given the power to order divestitures,
regulators will almost certainly exercise the power or risk public rebuke if
firms are bailed out.258 Again, this creates disincentives for firms to become
TBTF. Divestiture has long been an available remedy to counter excessive
power in the context of antitrust law. Indeed, famous examples include the
252
Ramirez, supra note 32, at 52 (“The subprime fiasco rose from one of the ‘worst miscalculations
in the annals of risk management.’”) (citing Shawn Tully, Wall Street's Money Machine Breaks Down,
FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/
11/26/101232838/index.htm).
253
See sources cited supra notes 26, 125, and 188.
254
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(2)(A)(i).
255
On December 11, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2009. Section 1105 of this proposed legislation included regulatory power
to order prudential divestitures of bank divisions or assets to reduce systemic risk. Posting of Steven
Ramirez to Corporate Justice Blog, http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/prudentialdivestitures-ii-or-iii-or-iv.html (Dec. 14, 2009, 8:57 EST).
256
There is strong empirical evidence that CEOs frequently lead their firms into value destroying
mergers, which is consistent with the idea that many such mergers are specifically intended to lead to
TBTF status. See STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 32-33, 66.
257
Exposing creditors to the risk of nonpayment is central to eliminating the distorted incentives of
TBTF. Id. at 2.
258
Gary Stern has proposed a similar approach focusing on a more stringent merger review. Bill
McConnell, Big, Bigger and Too Big, DEAL MAGAZINE, May 15, 2009, http://www.thedeal.com/
http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/features/big,-bigger-and-too-big.php. Legally, my proposal to
empower regulators to order prudential divestiture anytime a firm becomes TBTF focuses the reform
upon the core problem without interfering in general antitrust policy.
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break-up of Standard Oil Co. and AT&T, neither of which triggered the kind
of macroeconomic costs associated with TBTF.259
Fifth, harsh criminal and administrative penalties should follow
reckless conduct leading to bailouts. Currently, the FDIC retains broad
power to assess civil penalties to those exposing banks to unsafe or unsound
practices.260 There are also broad criminal prohibitions against bank
fraud.261 The FDIC routinely investigates claims against every manager of a
failed bank.262 Given the social costs implicit in TBTF, every disbursement
of government funds or assistance under systemic risk provisions should
trigger an automatic investigation of civil or criminal misconduct, as well as
claims that can lead to recoverable assets to defray bailout costs.263 Because
TBTF banks impose disproportionately large social costs, the penalties for
causing losses to such institutions should be more severe than the penalties
facing managers of ordinary banks—and should provide substantial
administrative fines (commensurate with the compensation earned by the
manager) to those managers causing loss through unsafe and unsound
practices. Further, any person causing a loss to a TBTF firm through
reckless misconduct should face incarceration akin to those convicted of
bank fraud. Managers have proven that the temptation to boost profits
through excessive risk can be irresistible.264 Knowledge that bailouts mean
subpoenas or worse may give pause to managers who may otherwise fall
prey to distorted incentives. Scholars have proposed dedicating Department
of Justice personnel to the pursuit of white collar criminals, and this
proposal would dovetail with such innovations.265
It would be hard to imagine managers that would expose themselves
to this battery of penalties. Capital requirements, leverage limitations, and
other prudential limitations, as the Obama Administration has proposed,

259
Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 26 (2009).
260
Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821 (k): Congressional Subsidizing of
Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 645-46, 658 (1996). An unsafe or
unsound practice is anything that results in an abnormal risk of loss to a financial institution. Id. at 658
n.183. Banking regulators have broad authority to sanction unsafe and unsound practices. Id. at 658
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994)).
261
See U.S. v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding bank fraud convictions
against borrower and bank officer even though loan was repaid in full).
262
Federal and State Enforcement of Consumer and Investor Protection Laws: Hearing Before the
H. Finance Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/fdic__gruenberg.pdf.
263
During the 1980s and 1990s, the FDIC, acting as receiver of failed banks recovered over $5
billion from the pursuit of professional liability claims, such as claims against directors and officers.
FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 266 (1998), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-11.pdf.
264
Ramirez, supra note 32, at 64-67.
265
See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force
to Top Priority, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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would complement these proposed reforms.266 Similarly, these proposed
sanctions contemplate that TBTF bailouts may well occur in the future
under a more formalized legal regime, such as that proposed by the Obama
Administration.267 Still, given the costs and the economic catastrophe
inherent in the TBTF doctrine, more needs to be done than the meager
disincentives currently proposed by the Obama Administration. Given these
costs, it is crucial that disincentives for managers be clear: CEO wealth, and
even liberty, is at stake should firms flirt with TBTF status. CEOs can be
expected to respond to these incentives just as they have exploited
incentives to dominate their firms and incur excessive risk in the cause of
short term profit. In sum, CEOs would be well advised to avoid becoming
TBTF in light of the sanctions proposed herein. This should operate to
minimize the TBTF problem.
Economist James Galbraith writes in The Predator State that our
system of government is rotting from the “systemic abuse of public
institutions for private profit.”268 In particular, he argues that corporate
elites constitute a “predator class” that subverted the rule of law.269
According to Galbraith, this class seized control of the state itself and “set
out to run . . . it—not for any ideological project but simply in a way that
would bring to them, individually and as a group, the most money.”270
Prophetically, Galbraith suggested these interests would seek government
rescues in times of trouble.271 More recently, Galbraith argued that
insolvent banks be rapidly shuttered and their managers terminated.272 New
managers will have proper incentives to write off toxic assets and sell the
remains into the market where the remaining capital can support lending.273
Going forward he suggests that large financial firms be fragmented into
smaller firms so that their failure can no longer propagate global financial

266
The Administration’s proposals include positive innovations, such as more expansive regulatory
net and more prudential limitations on TBTF financial institutions—defined as “Tier 1 Financial Holding
Companies.” See Proposed Legislation, supra note 190 (proposed legislation, Tit. II, § 204). The
proposals herein complement my previous proposals relating to corporate governance reforms. See
Ramirez, supra note 32, at 52-66.
267
Proposed Legislation, supra note 190, at §§1203-1204; see also id. § 1301 (formalizing Fed
authority under section 13(3)). Another laudable virtue of the Obama Administration’s proposal is that it
vests bailout authority in a depoliticized entity, specifically the Fed. Id. at § 1203(a). Bailout power, if
recognized at all, certainly should be vested in a depoliticized regulatory authority like the Fed. See
Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 591-93 (2000)
(arguing for further depoliticization of financial regulation and suggesting the Fed as the model for
depoliticized regulatory agencies).
268
JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED THE FREE
MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO xiii (2008).
269
Id. at 125.
270
Id. at 126.
271
Id.
272
Economist James Galbraith: Bailed-Out Banks Should Be Declared Insolvent, (Democracy Now
broadcast Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2009/2/10/economist_james_
galbraith_bailed_out_banks.
273
See id.
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meltdown.274 This he suggests is “common sense.”275 The current regime of
TBTF is simply an “affront to our democracy.”276 As such, continuation of
the TBTF regime will subvert the confidence of citizens in an evenhanded
legal framework governing economic activity and ultimately, in the rule of
law itself.277
CONCLUSION
The law can adjust incentives and disincentives facing managers of
firms flirting with TBTF status. Creating appropriate disincentives and
destroying destructive incentives for such managers should greatly mitigate
the huge costs implicit in implied government guarantees. Any tally of such
costs suggests that strong disincentives and greatly reduced incentives,
under a clear rule of law, are urgently needed. Indeed, financial firms are
exiting the current crisis bigger than ever while benefitting from greater
government commitments. Elites outside the financial system must exercise
their influence to weigh against this continued abuse of government
resources. Indeed, even elites within the financial system should demand
that the gross distortions that caused this crisis be deconstructed, as they
themselves suffered great damage from subsidies to a small handful of their
competitors.
This article argues that a combination of privatized,
administrative, and criminal sanctions can reset and rationalize incentives.
If the political heft of the financial sector prevails in securing more certain
government guarantees of failure, without legal penalties, the law will have
failed to prevent future financial meltdowns.
Moreover, given the huge economic stakes implicit in a
continuation of TBTF, as essentially formalized in the Obama
Administration’s proposal, our legal system will have devolved in large
measure into a political free for all insofar as economic law and regulation is
concerned. Such an outcome is too bitter to contemplate. For at time when
274

McConnell, supra note 258.
Id.
276
As former St. Louis Fed President William Poole states:
275

Our current bailout world is an affront to democracy. There is much anger in
our society. People who were responsible in their use of debt, many of whom are
struggling to stay current on their obligations, will eventually be taxed to cover
losses incurred by irresponsible borrowers and lenders. We know that many
executives of financial firms, despite huge losses, have larger fortunes remaining
than most of us can ever dream of enjoying. Taxpayers, in general, will pay for
losses incurred by the insolvent, or nearly insolvent, firms these executives left
behind. These bitter attitudes in our society today tend to be dismissed as
“populist.” That is a mischaracterization; no one, whatever his political persuasion,
should be willing to accept without complaint wealth transfers of the sort now
taking place.
Poole, supra note 237, at 7.
277
TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 141 (stating that an “indispensible element” of the rule of law is
that the “general populace” accepts the “propriety of” the legal system).
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the rule of law is revered as a source of macroeconomic growth, it will mean
that the U.S. has essentially devolved from a system where elites were
deprived of the ability to rig the economic system in their favor to a system
where economic and political power renders sound policy irrelevant. This
devolution in law is inconsistent with continued American economic
leadership. Perhaps some new economic power will see fit to minimize
costs implicit in the TBTF issue through the rule of law.
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